Strategy game

Results: 1036



#Item
441Solution concept / Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Rationalizability / Normal-form game / Strategic dominance / Strategy / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Information set / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Self-confirming equilibrium

Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium1 First version: April 25, 1995 This revision: July 12, 1999 Eddie Dekel

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 1999-07-12 13:09:31
442Nash equilibrium / Repeated game / Extensive-form game / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Minimax / Subgame / Strategy / Game theory / Problem solving / Mathematics

Title: The Castle on the Hill Author: David K. Levine Department of Economics UCLA Los Angeles, CA[removed]phone/fax[removed]

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2000-01-04 12:26:06
443Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Best response / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Strategy / Bayesian game / Risk dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Extensive-form game

When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27
444Self-confirming equilibrium / Nash equilibrium / Bayesian game / Extensive-form game / Strategy / Solution concept / Strategic dominance / Best response / The Intuitive Criterion / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002 Abstract

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 12:28:39
445Nash equilibrium / Subgame / Strategy / Information set / Bayesian game / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Solution concept

Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2005-07-18 17:35:40
446Nash equilibrium / Extensive-form game / Centipede game / Solution concept / Outcome / Strategy / Determinacy / Normal-form game / Best response / Game theory / Problem solving / Self-confirming equilibrium

MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:22:50
447Drew Fudenberg / Justin Yifu Lin / Economic growth / Technological change / Economics / China Center for Economic Research / Development economics

Economic Publications in Chinese Yong Wang September 2005 TRANSLATED BOOKS (into Chinese[removed]Game Theory, by Drew Fudenberg, and J. Tirole, MIT Press; China Renmin University Press, [removed]Individual Strategy and S

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Source URL: ihome.ust.hk

Language: English - Date: 2009-07-29 00:40:44
448Economics / Nash equilibrium / Price of anarchy / Submodular set function / Valuation / Price of stability / Strategy / Auction theory / Mechanism design / Game theory / Problem solving / Mathematics

The Pricing War Continues: On Competitive Multi-Item Pricing Omer Lev Joel Oren and Craig Boutilier Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

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Source URL: www.cs.toronto.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-27 10:18:19
449Outcome / Strategy / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Risk dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Nash equilibrium

Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41
450Outcome / Quadrature amplitude modulation / Strategy / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Risk dominance / Epsilon-equilibrium / Game theory / Problem solving / Nash equilibrium

The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2004-06-17 14:23:12
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